Public preference for data privacy - A pan-European study on metro/train surveillance by Patil, Sunil et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/93974/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Patil, Sunil, Patruni, Bhanu, Potoglou, Dimitris and Robinson, Neil 2016. Public preference for data
privacy - A pan-European study on metro/train surveillance. Transportation Research Part A: Policy
and Practice 92 , pp. 145-161. 10.1016/j.tra.2016.08.004 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2016.08.004
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2016.08.004>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
 Public Preference for Data Privacy– A Pan-European Study on Metro/Train Surveillance  1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
Sunil Patil, Corresponding Author 5 
RAND Europe 6 
Westbrook Centre, Milton Road, Cambridge, CB4 1YG, United Kingdom 7 
Tel: +44 1223 353 329 Fax: +44 1223 358 845; Email: spatil@rand.org  8 
 9 
Bhanu Patruni 10 
RAND Europe 11 
 12 
Dimitris Potoglou 13 
School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, United Kingdom 14 
 15 
Neil Robinson 16 
RAND Europe 17 
 18 
Patil, Patruni, Potoglou, Robinson   2 
 
ABSTRACT 1 
This paper presents a pan-European application of a stated preference dicrete choice experiment 2 
for eliciting respondents’ preferences for various data-privacy settings in the context of security 3 
and surveillance of train/metro facilities in Europe. Results show that respondents across the 27 4 
European Union Member States (EU27) prefer some Closed Circuit Television Cameras (CCTV) 5 
surveillance across in all countries, except Sweden where the most advanced type of CCTV with 6 
face recognition capabilities is preferred. Most respondents prefer that CCTV data is stored for 7 
future use rather than just being used for real-time monitoring, with the exception of respondents 8 
in Greece. However, an intermediate period of storage (15 days) is preferred over a shorter or 9 
longer duration (45 days). Respondents across the EU27 are averse to police force outside their 10 
home country having access to CCTV data. Respondents prefer the presence of unarmed security 11 
personnel over absence of security personnel. The majority of respondents are averse to any kind 12 
of security checks. However, in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the UK there is a preference 13 
for randomly selected people to go through a metal detector or full body scanner. Further this 14 
study shows that preferences also vary by age and gender. Overall, analysis of the data illustrates 15 
the complexity of the privacy over security debate as it pertains to transportation infrastructures. 16 
In particular, the increased use of transportation user data for various reasons (efficiency, safety 17 
and security) can pose complex social and ethical challenges to users, especially around 18 
perceptions of consent, accountability and transparency. 19 
 20 
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INTRODUCTION 1 
Railway and metro infrastructure are subject to a variety of types of criminal behahviour such as 2 
robbery, abuse and anti-social behaviour. In the last decade, these infrastructures have also 3 
become popular targets for terrorist attacks with deadly consequences. In the case of the latter, 4 
these have taken place at stations or on-board buses and trains at major capitals including 5 
Brussels (22/03/2016), London (7/7/2005), Madrid (11/03/2004), Moscow (29/03/2010), Paris 6 
(25/06, 17/08, 26/08 1995), and many other cities across the globe (Global Terrorism Database, 7 
2016). These incidents have shown that public transport systems are vulnerable and given the 8 
volume of travellers using them do remain a likely target for future terrorist attacks.  9 
 10 
As a consequence, there has been a shift in European security-policy towards – as stated by the 11 
European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, a 'common European Responsibility' 12 
(Friesen, 2007; European Commission, 2016). For example, the Internal Security Strategy 2010-13 
2014, the European Agenda on Security and the Treaty of Lisbon provide the policy and legal 14 
frameworks 'aiming at achieving liberty and security' in the European Union (European 15 
Commission, 2015). 16 
 17 
Practically, responses to the aforementioned terrorist attacks have also brought forward the 18 
deployment of a wide range of security measures and surveillance technologies in an attempt to 19 
mitigate the risk of incidents re-occurring and address the consequences should they occur. In 20 
many European countries and beyond, surveillance involving video or camera technology – what 21 
is widely known as Closed Circuit Television Cameras – is now a standard feature at stations and 22 
on board buses and carriages. For example, the London Underground has now more than 15,000 23 
CCTVs with a default footage-retention period of 14 days (TfL, 2016). Development of 24 
advanced CCTV-based surveillance technologies also means these systems are now capable of 25 
incorporating automated algorithms for the detection of dangerous conditions; for example, 26 
whether an individual carries a knife or firearms (Grega et al., 2016). New surveillance 27 
technologies are also capable of tracking behaviour and detect suspicious movements or certain 28 
patterns of clothing or baggage (Sahm, 2006). 29 
 30 
Other measures include deployment of additional number and of varying specialism security 31 
personnel including armed police and the military. Following the Brussels attacks in spring 2016, 32 
armed police were deployed to airports, train stations and other urban infrastructure where large 33 
numbers of people congregate in Europe. For example, France deployed an extra 1,600 police 34 
officers to transport hubs across the country with the majority of them based at Paris (The Local, 35 
2016). In many cases, security personnel were accompanied with sniffer dogs and extensive 36 
checks were also implemented. 37 
 38 
While such measures are aimed at providing increased levels of reassurance to the general 39 
public, they may compete with citizens' privacy, civil liberties and dignity (e.g. because of the 40 
need to physically check passengers and their bags) and protection of personal information (e.g. 41 
by recording CCTV footage). Thus a key aim for policy- making when confronted with the 42 
security challenge should be to strike the appropriate balance across security, privacy and dignity, 43 
whilst maintaining efficiency and convienence (since although extensive checks would achieve 44 
security objectives they would also bring the infrastructure to a halt, thus contributing to the 45 
achievement of the goals of the terrorist acts).. In this context, it is important to capture and 46 
understand the citizens' perspectives. Capturing public preferences is the only way to ensure 47 
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public views are represented in the decision- and policy-making process. Moreover, eliciting 1 
citizens' preferences provides guidance on best practices for communicating potential threats 2 
from loss of privacy and offer reasons on how potential threats to privacy may be mitigated. 3 
Thus one of the key aims of this study is to contribute to this debate and provide robust evidence 4 
based on citizens' preferences for security and privacy in the context of rail/metro travel. 5 
 6 
Using data from a pan-European survey, we investigate public preferences relating to data 7 
collected on train/metro facilities mainly for security and surveillance through the use of CCTV. 8 
The specific research questions include the following: 9 
1. Do respondents prefer facilities where less data is collected? 10 
2. Does the duration of data storage (retention) matter? 11 
3. Do respondents prefer certain geographic level of access (sharing) to data by authorities 12 
and government agencies (i.e., home country, EU, internationally)? 13 
4. Do these preferences vary across individuals and countries? 14 
The pan-European survey was conducted as part of PACT – "Public perception of security and 15 
privacy: Assessing knowledge, Collecting evidence, Translating research into action", a three-16 
year research project funded by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme. The 17 
overall aim of PACT has been to understand public perceptions of security, privacy and 18 
surveillance across the 27 European Union Member States (EU271). Among other research 19 
activities, PACT involved a survey questionnaire with three stated preference experiments each 20 
corresponding to the following choice contexts:   21 
1. Travel on metro or train, 22 
2. Choice of an Internet Service Provider, and 23 
3. Purchasing a device or service for storing health-related personal data. 24 
For the purposes of this paper, we only focus on travel on metro/train. Findings from this paper 25 
can inform on how planned security and surveillance measures on transport infrastructure 26 
facilities are perceived by users, providing the evidence base for informing regulations and best 27 
practices related to security and surveillance measures. This study also adds to the evidence on 28 
the applicability of stated preference methods for measuring perceptions related to security and 29 
privacy, which are frequently described as abstract and complex concepts.    30 
 31 
LITERATURE REVIEW 32 
Previous studies aimed at better understanding travellers' acceptance for travel-security and 33 
surveillance measures, have been limited in both their numbers and geographical context. 34 
Robinson (2010) and Potoglou et al. (2010) was one of the first quantitative studies to investigate 35 
preferences of travellers for privacy and security was reported in Robinson (2010 and Potoglou 36 
et al (2010). Their findings came from the analysis of a survey-based stated preference discrete 37 
choice experiment involving a little over 2,000 participants in the UK. The experiment involved 38 
varying surveillance and security settings that a traveller may encounter prior to a rail journey; 39 
the experiment presented respondents with potential benefits from the implementation of those 40 
measures (e.g. disruption of an incident and effective response of the authorities upon an incident 41 
taking place) as well as financial costs to cover security improvements and delays to go through 42 
                                                     
1 At the time of inception of this project (in 2012) there were only 27 Member States of the EU. Croatia 
joined the EU in 2013 and was not included in the scope of this project. 
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security. Findings showed that UK respondents would accept standard and advanced CCTV 1 
surveillance and opted-in for non-physical security checks (X-ray imaging). On the other hand, 2 
they were less likely to select a scenario that involved physical security checks (pat-down and 3 
bag search). Finally, respondents were more likely to choose travel settings with more 4 
specialised security personnel at rail stations, except from non-white, non-conservative 5 
individuals who were less likely to opt-in for settings where uniformed military were present. 6 
 7 
Following the 7/7 London bombings, the UK Department for Transport commissioned a number 8 
of trials in London underground and rail stations in England to capture passengers' acceptance 9 
levels and response to transport security measures involving full-body scanners and luggage X-10 
ray and sniffer dogs (Turley and Stone, 2006a; 2006b cited in Carter et al., 2015). Follow up 11 
qualitative interviews and discussion groups with study participants revealed that full-body 12 
scanners were an issue particularly for younger and Muslim women, but less of an issue for men 13 
and older women. All study participants felt that all travellers should be subject to checks 14 
through a body scanner rather than a random sample of travellers. Participants also felt that 15 
conventional ways of scanning would cause delays and suggested that technologies should 16 
enable scanning whilst walking (Turley and Stone, 2006a; 2006b cited in Carter et al., 2015). 17 
London trials also involved traveller random stop-and-search where dogs sniffed closed luggage 18 
followed by physical checks by British Transport Police. Individuals expressed concerns about 19 
their dignity and also felt that physical search was embarrassing for them (Turley and Stone, 20 
2006a; 2006b cited in Carter et al., 2015).  21 
 22 
While the abovementioned studies provide detailed evidence from the UK, it is not entirely clear 23 
whether citizens of other European countries would similarly respond. This is quite important 24 
given that European policy is directed to citizens representing a wide array of cultures, languages 25 
and worldviews thus not necessary conventional with evidence coming from a single country. 26 
Therefore, this study is also aimed at addressing this gap in the literature by reporting on findings 27 
at the pan-European level. 28 
 29 
Other studies of similar nature to the above report findings in the context of air travel. Viensten 30 
et al. (2011) elicit preferences for different security measures for mitigating the risk of aviation 31 
terrorism. Security screening type, travel time, cost and the impact expressed as number of 32 
fatalities because of a terrorist attack were the attributes employed to describe hypothetical air 33 
travel situations. The study was based on a discrete choice experiment which was administered 34 
via the Internet and involved 472 Norwegians. Each participant was presented with a scenario 35 
under which they had to be identified via a biometric identity card and if disqualified as 'low-risk 36 
passengers' they had to undergo through a body scanner. Respondents opted-in for protection of 37 
their privacy rather than going through a body scanner; even after circumstances where the 38 
perceived level of terrorist risk and subsequently the likelihood of preventing fatalities could be 39 
reduced. The study also aimed at computing the value of statistical life (VSL) respondents' 40 
placed upon an air terrorist attack, but the authors do highlight VSL values of €177 mil., an order 41 
of magnitude higher than those adopted by Scandinavian governments.  42 
 43 
Also in the context of air-travel security, Dillon and Thomas (2015) examined the US general 44 
public's privacy concerns caused by body scanning and pat-down-body searches during 45 
passenger airport screening. The sample involved 860 adults who lived in the Mid-Atlantic 46 
States of New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia. Their study reported high levels of 47 
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trust on the security authorities by lower education-attainment participants. Security checks using 1 
full-body scanning was broadly acceptable by air travellers, however, there were differences 2 
across ethic groups; for example, Black, Hispanic and Asian and minority-religions individuals 3 
were less likely to accept full-body scanning. In addition, women were less likely to accept pat-4 
down full body searching. Finally, Beck et al. (2015) examined the choice between two security 5 
processes when respondents were about to join an international flight from Australia. The survey 6 
was conducted following the MH370 and MH17 Malaysia Airlines disasters and involved 304 7 
participants. The data collection involved astated preference experiment and incorporated 8 
attributes and levels developed by Potoglou et al. (2010) and Patil et al. (2014). Findings pointed 9 
towards three classes of travellers: (a) those who were 'trusting' the authorities and were willing 10 
to accept a range of security measures including privacy-intrusive measures; (b) those who were 11 
'nervous' and would be willing to fly only with presence of security personnel (uniformed or not) 12 
on board the aircraft; and (c) 'status quo' travellers who felt that the current level of security 13 
provided sufficient protection. 14 
 15 
To our knowledge, the only study on privacy and security conducted at multi-country level is by 16 
Carter et al. (2015) who conducted an online survey to elicit travellers' opinions, acceptability 17 
and perceived effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures at rail stations across England, Spain, 18 
Romania and Italy in 2013. Findings showed that security staff and security measures would 19 
reassure travellers. On the other hand, airport-style security checks were less popular and there 20 
were mixed responses about sniffer dogs and the storage of personal data. The authors did point 21 
out significant variation in preferences variationsacross British, Italian, Spanish and Romanian 22 
respondents; for example, Italians were more  open to airport-style screening than British 23 
participants. Shortcomings of the study included the relatively small sample size, which also 24 
limited the opportunity to generalise the results given limited representation of countries. Finally, 25 
questions were purely opinion based with very little room to capture responses to varying 26 
settings of security and surveillance. This study addresses these shortcomings by collecting data 27 
across the EU27 with sample sizes varying from 750 to 1,000 participants per country. 28 
 29 
The work reported in this study builds upon some of those previous efforts and is follow on work 30 
from the pilot of the project reported by Patil et al. (2014) and a previous study Robinson et al. 31 
(2010). It further makes an attempt to provide robust evidence based on the whether citizens 32 
would forgo some civil liberties in the name of security and convience, especially in the context 33 
of mass public-transport travel across EU27. 34 
 35 
 36 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND DATA 37 
The survey questionnaire was developed using contributions from the project consortium 38 
consisting of experts in security and privacy along with stakeholder consultation, expert 39 
interviews and focus groups. The scenarios in the stated preference experiments were extensively 40 
tested through cognitive interviews and pilot surveys. The pilot surveys were conducted in 41 
Denmark, Italy and Romania in May 2013 by surveying about 50 respondents in each of these 42 
countries (PACT D2.3 2014). Using the feedback from the pilot surveys and cognitive interviews 43 
the questionnaire was simplified and modified significantly. An additional small pilot was 44 
deemed necessary to test the modified questionnaire. Accordingly, a second smaller pilot survey 45 
(with 50 respondents) was undertaken in Romania in July 2013 before starting the main stage of 46 
data collection. The fieldwork for the main stage of data collection in each of the EU27 countries 47 
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was carried out from August to November 2013 (see PACT D3.2, 2014 for details). Respondents 1 
were selected (according to quotas for age, gender and region) to participate either in an online 2 
or face-to-face interview. Online surveys were conducted in 12 countries with comparatively 3 
higher Internet penetration whereas face-to-face interviews took place in the 13 countries with 4 
lower Internet penetration. In Italy and Germany, a mixed methods approach- using both types of 5 
interviews- was used to allow us to examine and control differences by survey mode.   6 
 7 
Each respondent participated in up to two stated preference experiments from the three potential 8 
contexts. It should be noted that the time period for the main stage fieldwork overlapped with 9 
publications in the news about National Security Agency (NSA) and Government 10 
Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ) secret surveillance, which might have conceivably 11 
influenced some responses due to heightened awareness of issues relating to privacy.  12 
 13 
Survey Instrument 14 
Stated preference experiments have been used extensively in the fields of marketing, transport 15 
economics, environmental valuation, health and healthcare (Louviere, 1992; Louviere et al. 16 
2000; Louviere and Woodworth, 1983; Ryan et al. 2001). Using experimental design principles, 17 
the researcher constructs a series of hypothetical choice scenarios from a combination of 18 
attributes and levels describing the alternatives in a choice scenario. In each choice scenario, the 19 
respondent is asked to indicate the most preferred alternative (Figure 1). Using discrete choice 20 
models, the analysis of these preferences can yield information on the relative importance of the 21 
attributes used to describe the alternatives. 22 
 23 
Robinson et al. (2010) and Veisten et al. (2011) have recently used the stated preference 24 
experiments in the field of travel security and privacy; however, these studies frame the choice 25 
scenarios differently and do not include the privacy issues related to data protection. In this 26 
study, we apply this method for a travel choice involving security measures both with and 27 
without privacy implications. Thus the preferences provided by respondents are based on their 28 
perceptions related to effectiveness of security and surveillance measures and likelihood of 29 
violation of privacy. We explicitly avoid referring to the effectiveness of security measures (or 30 
lack of it) and subsequent possible violation of privacy (or lack of it). However, we do ask 31 
respondents prior to the stated preference questions to indicate if they have witnessed or 32 
experienced any of the security threats involved in train/metro travel and how concerned they are 33 
regarding privacy issues arising out of surveillance. The objective of asking these questions was 34 
to make respondents aware of different security and privacy issues involved in train/metro travel 35 
before they were presented with the stated preference questions. These questions also provide an 36 
opportunity to obtain insight into the preferences regarding some attributes which are not 37 
included in the stated preference questions to avoid information overload. 38 
 39 
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 1 FIGURE 1  Example of the stated preference experiment in PACT. 2 
 3 
The stated preference experiment in this study involved asking respondents to indicate their 4 
preferred setting when travelling by metro or train.  Only respondents who indicated that they 5 
previously travelled by train/metro were presented the stated preference questions. Each 6 
alternative was described using different attributes and levels (Table 1). Different configurations 7 
of levels across all the attributes differentiated one alternative from another in a given choice 8 
scenario. The choice scenarios were generated using an experimental design. Full questionnaire 9 
including the details on experimental design are described in PACT’s project deliverable (PACT 10 
D2.3, 2014).  11 
 12 
Data 13 
Approximately 1,000 respondents aged 18 and older were interviewed in all the countries except 14 
for Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus where about 750 responses were collected due to smaller 15 
population sizes. About half of all the respondents answered questions on travel context which is 16 
relevant for this paper. Each respondent answered five stated preference exercises resulting into a 17 
total of 64,785 choices from 12,957 respondents. About 6.7% of the observations are excluded 18 
because they could be possibly unreliable (based on reported understanding of the experiment 19 
and unrealistically less time taken to complete the exercise). Further, excluding the missing 20 
responses leaves 60,472 observations (choices) for the stated preference modelling exercise. 21 
Further details on sample sizes by country and survey mode are provided in PACT D4.1 (2014). 22 
 23 
  24 
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TABLE 1 Attributes and Levels in the Metro/Travel Choice Scenarios 1 
Attribute Details Levels 
Type of CCTV 
cameras 
This attribute describes if a 
CCTV camera is used and 
its features. 
Standard CCTV – working like a television 
Advanced CCTV that can detect abandoned bags 
Advanced CCTV that can recognise suspicious 
movements of people 
Advanced CCTV that can recognise faces 
No CCTV cameras 
How long CCTV 
Camera information 
is stored? 
Time period CCTV data 
may be  stored (conditional 
on presence of CCTV ) 
CCTV information not stored for future use-only used 
in real time monitoring 
CCTV information stored for 3 days 
CCTV information stored for 7 days 
CCTV information stored for 15 days 
CCTV information stored for 45 days 
Who can access 
CCTV Camera 
information? 
Type of authorities who 
may access the CCTV data 
(conditional on presence of 
CCTV), Level 1 
corresponds to the 
respondent's  country of 
residence [e.g. UK, FR]  
Only police departments in the [UK] have access to the 
camera information 
All European police departments have access to the 
camera information 
All police departments worldwide have access to the 
camera information 
Security personnel 
at the station 
Type of security personnel, 
if present 
No security personnel 
Unarmed security personnel employed by a private 
company 
Armed security personnel employed by a private 
company 
Unarmed police 
Armed police 
Type of security 
checks at the station 
Type of security measures 
when deployed 
People randomly selected for physical search and bag 
check 
People randomly selected to go through metal detector 
or full body scanner 
No physical security checks 
Time to go through 
security checks 
Delay incurred  due to 
security checks (No delay if 
no security measure 
deployed) 
10 seconds 
30 seconds 
1 minute 
2 minutes 
5 minutes 
No delay 
Security surcharge 
on top of ticket cost 
(per trip) 
Levels are adjusted to 
display cost in Euro or local 
currency (e.g. £) 
No security surcharge 
Security surcharge of 0.05 Euro 
Security surcharge of 0.10 Euro  
Security surcharge of 0.30 Euro 
Security surcharge of 0.50 Euro 
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Security surcharge of 1.00 Euro 
MODELING APPROACH 1 
The responses obtained through the choice experiments are analysed using a multinomial logit 2 
model.  The model is based on the principle of Random Utility Maximisation (RUM) (Ben-3 
Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Marschak, 1974; McFadden, 1978). According to RUM, a respondent 4 
choses an alternative which provides maximum utility. Utility is a latent construct divided in two 5 
components; a deterministic and a random (error) component. The deterministic component of 6 
the utility can be specified using observable variables which are likely to affect the respondent’s 7 
choice as follows:  8 �௜௝ = ���௝ +∑ (�௝௞�௝௞)�௞=1        (1) 9 
 10 
where: 11 
Vij is deterministic component of utility for individual i and alternative j 12 
ASCj is the alternative specific constant of the alternative j  13 
Xjk is kth variable which describes the alternative j, k=1,.., K 14 
βjk is the coefficient to be estimated 15 
 16 
The multinomial logit model assumes that the error components are extreme value (or Gumbel) 17 
distributed, and the choice probability Pij of an alternative j for individual i is given by Equation 18 
2. 19 
 20 �௜௝ = ���⁡ሺ�೔ೕሻ∑ ���⁡ሺ�೔ೕሻ�ೕ=1          (2) 21 
 22 
The multinomial logit model used in this study has been developed using the data from all the 23 
respondents in the EU27 countries. Hence, a single weight is estimated for each of the attribute 24 
levels, which could be interpreted as the EU average value. However, even in this case, when 25 
pooling data from different country samples it is necessary to consider the possible variation in 26 
the unobserved factors or error-variation in the models between countries. These can include 27 
different measurement errors across samples and other unobserved cultural and contextual 28 
factors. Furthermore, surveys in some countries were carried out online, while others were 29 
undertaken ‘face to face’. These two types of survey modes may also give rise to variations in 30 
unobserved factors or error-variation in the models, which need to be controlled for. Accordingly, 31 
the variation in quality of responses across the following two dimensions is taken into account: 32  Country scales to control for country-specific unobserved factors such as difference in 33 
quality of data and survey implementation across the EU27.  34  Scales by survey methodology to control for variation in response quality between the 35 
online and face-to-face survey methodologies.  36 
Further, to account for correlations between multiple stated preference responses from one 37 
respondent, a panel specification can be specified. A panel specification however increases the 38 
model estimation time considerably for the large dataset we are using. Hence in order to correct 39 
for model mis-specification and to take into account the repeated nature of the SP data we use 40 
bootstrap resampling procedure on the final model (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994).  41 
42 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 1 
In this section we present the results of the discrete choice models of stated preferences related to 2 
CCTV data privacy and other security measures. The summary of experiences related to security 3 
threats and privacy concerns as captured by questions before the stated preference questions is 4 
also presented in this section.   5 
 6 
Security threats in train/metro travel  7 
Figure 2 shows the various security threats that respondents across EU27 have either experienced 8 
or witnessed during a metro/train journey. The following observations can be drawn from Figure 9 
2: 10 
1. Pick-pocketing has been experienced by 9% of the respondents while travelling on a 11 
metro/train and 13% of the respondents witnessed an act of pick-pocketing.  12 
2. More than 50% of the respondents have witnessed anti-social behaviour and fare evasion. 13 
3. More than 20% of the respondents have witnessed vandalism and violence during their 14 
journeys.  15 
4. 3% of respondents stated that they have experienced terrorism. 16 
 These experiences are likely to affect preferences related to security and surveillance measures. 17 
 18 FIGURE 2  Proportion of respondents who have experienced or witnessed security threats. 19 
 20 
Privacy Concern across EU27 21 
Respondents' concern for privacy while travelling are collected on a Likert-type scale ranging 22 
from ‘Not concerned at all’ to ‘Very concerned’ based on their responses to the  following 23 
question: 24 
How concerned are you about the following when travelling by train or metro? 25  Misuse of CCTV camera images by the authorities  26  Misuse of travel data (travel origin, destination, frequency) for tracking a 27 
person’s whereabouts 28  Misuse of security measures for sexual or racial harassment 29  Sharing travel data and CCTV images across and outside the EU.  30 
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 1 
Table 2 presents a summary of responses capturing privacy concern across the EU27. While each 2 
of these four statements reflects a different type of privacy threat, it can be observed that the 3 
percentage of respondents with each level of concern is broadly similar across all four 4 
statements. 5 
 6 
TABLE 2 Privacy concerns across EU27 7 
  
1  
(not 
concerned 
at all) 
2 3 4 
5  
(very 
concerned
) 
Total 
Number 
of 
Responses 
Misuse of CCTV camera 
images by the authorities 32.4% 22.0% 22.2% 13.8% 9.6% 12,720 
Misuse of travel data (travel 
origin, destination, frequency) 
for tracking a person’s 
whereabouts 
28.3% 22.2% 23.4% 15.7% 10.4% 12,742 
Misuse of security measures for 
sexual or racial harassment 29.0% 20.5% 23.3% 15.5% 11.7% 12,693 
Sharing travel data and CCTV 
images across and outside the 
EU 
27.3% 20.5% 24.5% 16.1% 11.6% 12,670 
 8 
Accordingly, an overall index which represents the respondents’ concern for privacy while 9 
travelling is derived based on the number of ‘concerned’ responses to the above statements. 10 
Respondents are classified into four categories: High Concern (3 or more ‘concerned’ responses); 11 
Medium Concern (2 ‘concerned’ responses); Low Concern (1 ‘concerned’ response) and No 12 
Concern.  13 
 14 
Figure 3 shows the variation in proportion of respondents with ‘High Concern’ for privacy in 15 
Travel context across the EU27. The following observations can be drawn: 16 
1. The highest proportions of respondents with ‘No Concern’ for privacy in the Travel 17 
context are observed in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), and in 18 
Slovakia and Netherlands. 19 
2. The highest proportion of respondents with ‘High Concern’ for privacy in the Travel 20 
context are observed in southern European countries ( Spain, Greece and Portugal) and 21 
central eastern European countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria). 22 
 23 
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 1 FIGURE 3  Proportion of respondents with high travel-privacy-concern index. 2 
  3 
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Results of the discrete choice model  1 
Table 3 presents estimated parameters of the multinomial logit model. Since the choice scenario 2 
involves three unlabelled alternatives only one alternative specific constant is estimated, placed 3 
on the utility of the “None of these” alternative (labelled ‘none’ in Table 3). This constant is 4 
specified to be country specific including a separate constant for methodology in Italy and 5 
Germany where both online and face-to-face surveys were used. 6 
 7 
The effects of socio-economic variables such as age, gender, income, education level and 8 
working status on the preferences relating to security and surveillance are also included in the 9 
discrete choice models. Only the statistically significant coefficients at a 95 per cent level of 10 
confidence are retained in the final model specification. 11 
 12 
Preferences across EU27 countries 13 
We observe broadly similar preferences across countries. Where the preferences differ 14 
significantly in a given country these are specifically identified and the effects are presented in 15 
Figures 4 to 6 (the definition of country acronyms can be found in the Appendix). The values 16 
shown in these charts are expressed in units of utility in order to highlight differences in relative 17 
preference across countries. Furthermore, bars to the right of the vertical axis represent positive 18 
preferences and those to the left represent disinclination. The length of a bar is indicative of the 19 
strength of a preference relative to the baseline of each attribute. In each figure, the series 20 
marked by ‘all other’ refers to the EU27 countries, excluding the countries identified in the chart. 21 
The ‘all other’ group is therefore, in most cases, representative of respondents in most EU 22 
countries. It should be noted that the ‘all other’ group also includes the reference level of 23 
significant socio-economic effects. However, confounding of these effects should not affect the 24 
relative comparison of utilities between countries (note that the socio-economic effects are not 25 
specified to be country specific). 26 
 27 
Type of CCTV camera 28 
In most EU27 countries, respondents prefer CCTV cameras when compared to the reference 29 
level, ‘No CCTV’. As shown in Figure 4, respondents’ preferences for the types of CCTV are in 30 
the following order: (1) advanced CCTV that can detect faces, (2) CCTV that can detect 31 
abandoned bags, (3) CCTV that can recognise suspicious movements of people, and finally, (4) 32 
standard CCTV (which works like a television).  33 
 34 
However, the strength of preference for the different CCTV camera types differs across eleven 35 
countries. While all types of CCTV cameras are still preferred over ‘No CCTV’ in these 36 
countries, the magnitude of preference varies. We observe stronger preference for all types of 37 
cameras in France, and stronger preference for standard CCTV cameras over other camera types 38 
in Sweden, whereas in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 39 
Poland, Portugal and Slovakia the preference for CCTV cameras is weaker compared to other 40 
countries in the EU27. 41 
  42 
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TABLE 3a Model Results- Main effects  1 
Summary statistics     
Observations 60,472 
Final Log Likelihood -61,319.3 
D.O.F 137 
Rho²(0) 0.077 
Rho²(c) 0.054 
Description Label Coefficient t-ratio 
Type of CCTV cameras       
Standard CCTV – working like a television cam_std 0.8358 12.64 
Advanced CCTV that can detect abandoned bags cam_bag 0.9429 13.15 
Advanced CCTV that can recognise suspicious movements of people cam_sus 0.8718 12.69 
Advanced CCTV that can recognise faces cam_face 0.9785 13.24 
No CCTV cameras cam_none 0 n/a 
How long CCTV camera information is stored    
    
CCTV information not stored for future use – only real-time monitoring dur_rt 0.0000 n/a 
CCTV information stored for 3 days dur_3d 0.1801 6.82 
CCTV information stored for 7 days dur_7d 0.3156 9.80 
CCTV information stored for 15 days dur_15d 0.3225 10.09 
CCTV information stored for 45 days dur_45d 0.1666 6.23 
Who can access CCTV camera information   
    
Only police departments in the [UK] have access to the camera information acc_op 0.0000 n/a 
All European police departments have access to the camera information acc_eu -0.1261 -6.83 
All police departments worldwide have access to the camera information acc_int -0.2327 -9.72 
Security personnel at the station       
No security personnel per_none 0 n/a 
Unarmed security personnel employed by a private company pers_pvt 0.3115 10.24 
Armed security personnel employed by a private company pers_ta 0.2336 8.32 
Unarmed police pers_pol 0.4450 11.78 
Armed police pers_arm 0.2205 7.83 
Type of security checks at the station   
    
People randomly selected for physical search and bag check sec_pd -0.2449 -9.50 
People randomly selected to go through metal detector or full body scanner sec_md -0.0318 -1.65 
No physical security checks sec_none 0 n/a 
Time to go through security checks 
time -0.0003 -8.55 
10 seconds 
30 seconds 
1 minute 
2 minutes 
5 minutes 
Security surcharge on top of ticket cost       
HH Income less than €500 cost_1t4 -0.0074 -10.05 
HH Income from €500 to €1,250 cost_5t6 -0.0059 -10.28 
HH Income from €1,250 to €5,000 cost_7t14 -0.0040 -11.40 
HH Income greater than €5,000 cost_gt14 -0.0033 -5.17 
Missing Income (Low-income countries) cost_NA_L -0.0134 -10.16 
Missing Income (Medium-income countries) cost_NA_M -0.0066 -7.02 
Missing Income (High-income counties) cost_NA_H -0.0071 -3.11 
 2 
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TABLE 3b Model Results- Country and socio-economic interaction effects 1 
Description  Label Description  Coefficients t-ratio 
Type of CCTV cameras         
Standard CCTV – working like a television cam_std_SE Sweden 0.2534 3.76 
Advanced CCTV that can recognise faces Camface_HU Hungary -0.2254 -3.39 
No CCTV cameras 
Nocam_BG Bulgaria 0.5875 6.12 
Nocam_CZ Czech Republic 0.7531 9.31 
Nocam  DK  Denmark 0.4228 5.52 
Nocam_EL Greece 0.6566 7.69 
Nocam_FR France -0.3605 -1.86 
Nocam_HU Hungary 0.5636 7.07 
Nocam_LV Latvia 0.5504 4.92 
Nocam_MT Malta 0.0000 n/a 
Nocam_PL Poland 0.4607 4.24 
Nocam_PT Portugal 0.7008 6.45 
Nocam_SK Slovakia 0.6238 6.44 
Nocam_male Male 0.1715 5.20 
Nocam_1824 Age group 18–24 0.0954 1.91 
Nocam_5564 Age group 55–64 -0.1268 -2.98 
How long CCTV camera information is stored?         
CCTV information not stored for future use –only 
real-time monitoring 
dur_rt_AT Austria 0.1858 2.27 
dur_rt_EL Greece 0.3542 4.65 
dur_rt_EE Estonia -0.3248 -3.68 
dur_rt_IE Ireland -0.2105 -2.84 
CCTV information stored for 45 days 
dur_45d_MT Malta 0.0000 n/a 
dur_45d_ES Spain 0.2400 3.33 
dur_45d_CZ Czech Republic -0.2153 -2.89 
Who can access CCTV camera information         
All European police departments have access to 
the camera information acc_eu_LV Latvia -0.2672 -2.78 
All police departments worldwide have access to 
the camera information acc_int_DE Germany -0.3473 -3.74 
Security personnel at the station         
No security personnel 
nospers_BE Belgium -0.2234 -2.87 
nospers_CY Cyprus -0.6167 -2.83 
nospers_CZ Czech Republic 0.2399 3.94 
nospers_DE Germany 0.2673 4.89 
nospers_ES Spain -0.4031 -4.99 
nospers_FR France -0.5466 -3.33 
nospers_HU Hungary 0.2722 4.29 
nospers_IT Italy -0.2368 -2.66 
Unarmed security personnel employed by a private 
company perspvt_FR France -0.4115 -3.60 
Armed security personnel employed by a private 
company 
persta_DE Germany -0.4010 -5.58 
persta_EE Estonia 0.1403 2.04 
persta_FR France -0.3465 -2.95 
persta_IE Ireland -0.2299 -3.60 
persta_UK UK -0.2682 -3.95 
Armed police 
persarm_BE Belgium 0.2361 3.51 
persarm_FR France 0.3735 3.67 
persarm_PL Poland -0.3400 -3.28 
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Type of security checks at the station         
No physical security checks 
nosec_AT Austria 0.2671 4.57 
nosec_CZ Czech Republic 0.2064 3.62 
nosec_DE Germany 0.4974 5.51 
nosec_DK Denmark 0.1342 2.83 
nosec_ES Spain -0.1416 -2.88 
nosec_FR France -0.1850 -2.83 
nosec_IT Italy -0.2843 -4.26 
nosec_LV Latvia 0.3802 4.23 
nosec_PL Poland 0.3058 3.50 
nosec_SE Sweden 0.2332 3.99 
nosec_SI Slovenia 1.1783 2.76 
nosec_SK Slovakia 0.2648 3.47 
nosec_UK UK -0.1284 -2.46 
People randomly selected to go through metal 
detector or full body scanner 
sec_md_BG Bulgaria 0.1959 3.00 
sec_md_LU Luxembourg -0.2542 -3.50 
secmd_1824 Age group 18–24 0.0602 1.73 
 1 
TABLE 3c Model Results- Country and socio-economic effects on scales and the constant 2 
Scales None constant 
Country  Label  Coef.  t-ratio Country  Label  Coef.  t-ratio 
Austria Scale_AT 1.0000 n/a Italy (Face) None_IT_F -0.0944 -0.7 
Belgium Scale_BE 1.1690 10.8 Italy (Online) None_IT_O 0.1007 1.0 
Bulgaria Scale_BG 1.0387 6.6 UK None_UK 0.2613 4.0 
Cyprus Scale_CY 0.8774 5.3 Sweden None_SE 0.9846 11.5 
Czech 
Republic Scale_CZ 1.4830 6.7 Spain None_ES 0.2735 4.0 
Denmark Scale_DK 1.5837 9.2 Slovenia None_SI 0.9659 4.4 
Estonia Scale_EE 1.0703 10.7 Slovakia None_SK 0.5923 7.2 
Finland Scale_FI 1.0903 11.0 Romania None_RO -0.4055 -2.5 
France Scale_FR 0.9150 6.7 Portugal None_PT 0.5911 6.9 
Germany Scale_DE 0.9054 8.9 Poland None_PL 0.8790 9.9 
Greece Scale_EL 1.3550 6.6 Netherlands None_NL 0.3597 4.8 
Hungary Scale_HU 1.6390 6.9 Malta None_MT -0.2613 -1.7 
Ireland Scale_IE 1.1664 11.3 Luxembourg None_LU 0.3513 4.2 
Italy Scale_IT 1.0825 9.6 Lithuania None_LT 0.1498 0.6 
Latvia Scale_LV 1.0086 6.3 Latvia None_LV -0.6409 -3.4 
Lithuania Scale_LT 0.6654 3.4 Ireland None_IE 0.3804 6.0 
Luxembourg Scale_LU 0.9271 9.5 Hungary None_HU 1.0252 12.0 
Malta Scale_MT 1.0878 6.3 Greece None_EL 0.3892 4.5 
Netherlands Scale_NL 0.9444 9.9 Germany (Face) None_DE_F 0.4230 3.8 
Poland Scale_PL 1.1924 6.4 Germany (Online) None_DE_O 0.7058 7.5 
Portugal Scale_PT 1.0543 6.3 France None_FR -0.0833 -0.5 
Romania Scale_RO 0.6846 6.2 Finland None_FI 0.7701 10.8 
Slovakia Scale_SK 1.1285 6.4 Estonia None_EE 0.0811 1.0 
Slovenia Scale_SI 0.4128 3.6 Denmark None_DK 1.1011 12.4 
Spain Scale_ES 1.2204 11.1 Czech Republic None_CZ 0.9664 11.4 
Sweden Scale_SE 1.1708 11.0 Cyprus None_CY 0.2371 1.6 
UK Scale_UK 1.1836 11.1 Bulgaria None_BG -0.6235 -3.7 
Survey method effects Belgium None_BE 0.5128 7.2 
Online Scale_O 1.0000 n/a Austria None_AT 0.7045 8.5 
Face to Face Scale_F 0.8298 10.3     
 3 
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 1 FIGURE 4  Relative preferences for different types of CCTV across the EU27. 2 
 3 
Duration of storage 4 
In most EU27 countries, given that CCTV cameras are used, respondents prefer that CCTV 5 
information is stored for future use, relative to the reference level that CCTV information is only 6 
used for real-time monitoring. The magnitude of the coefficients for the duration of storage 7 
indicates the respondents’ order of preference for storing CCTV information. We observe a U-8 
shaped pattern: 15 days’ storage time is the most preferred, followed by 7 days and 3 days 9 
whereas 45 days is the least preferred (see, Figure 5). 10 
 11 
Contrary to the above preferences in most EU27 countries, respondents in Greece indicate a 12 
strong aversion to storage of CCTV data and prefer only real-time monitoring. This outlying 13 
dispreference for storage of surveillance data in Greece could be due to a history of authorative 14 
surveillance in the country (see, Samatas (2002, 2008) for details). Furthermore, respondents in 15 
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the Czech Republic show disinclination towards storage of CCTV data for 45 days and those in 1 
Spain prefer storage for longer durations over shorter ones. Respondents in Estonia and Ireland 2 
indicate stronger preferences for data storage over real-time use compared to other countries in 3 
the EU27. Respondents in Austria prefer real-time use and medium-term storage (7 to 15 days). 4 
 5 
 6 FIGURE 5  Relative preferences for duration of storage of CCTV data 7 
 8 
Access to CCTV data 9 
Across the EU27, respondents show a disinclination towards the option of CCTV information 10 
being accessed by police departments outside their home country (across Europe and 11 
worldwide), although they are more averse to CCTV information being shared among all police 12 
departments worldwide than across only European police departments. Respondents in Germany 13 
indicate a stronger disinclination towards the option of providing access to all police departments 14 
worldwide compared to other countries in the EU27. Respondents in Latvia are more averse to 15 
CCTV information being shared across Europe than other countries in the EU27. These effects 16 
are shown in Figure 6. 17 
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 1 FIGURE 6 Relative preferences for geographic level of access to CCTV data 2 
 3 
Security Personnel  4 
In most EU27 countries, respondents prefer having security personnel at train/metro stations 5 
relative to the reference level of ‘No security personnel’. Unarmed police is the most preferred 6 
option, followed by unarmed security personnel employed by a private company and armed 7 
police; armed security personnel employed by a private company are least preferred. 8 
 9 
Preferences in favour of security personnel are stronger in Belgium, Cyprus, France, Spain and 10 
Italy compared to other countries in the EU27, whereas they are lower in the Czech Republic, 11 
Germany and Hungary. Contrary to the pattern in other countries, respondents in Germany, 12 
Hungary and the UK indicate disinclination towards armed security personnel employed by a 13 
private company when compared with settings involving no security personnel. Respondents in 14 
Germany and Hungary also indicate disinclination towards armed police, along with those in 15 
Czech Republic and Poland. Armed security personnel employed by a private company are also 16 
less preferred than other security personnel in France and Ireland (however, they are still 17 
preferred over having no security personnel), whereas in Estonia they are preferred over unarmed 18 
personnel employed by a private company. In Belgium and France, armed police are the most 19 
preferred type of security personnel, with respondents in France indicating stronger preference 20 
for police (armed/unarmed) over private security personnel. 21 
 22 
Security Checks 23 
Respondents across Europe are averse to having to go through physical security checks, and are 24 
more averse to physical searches that include a bag search than going through a full body scanner 25 
or metal detector. However, the disinclination towards a physical check involving a metal 26 
detector/full body scanner compared to no physical checks becomes statistically insignificant 27 
after controlling for the country and socio-economic variables.  28 
 29 
In more than half of the EU27 countries, respondents exhibit significantly different preferences 30 
for security checks. In Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Latvia, Poland, Sweden, 31 
Slovenia and Slovakia the disinclination is stronger and significant for both types of physical 32 
checks. However, respondents in Spain, France and the UK indicate a weaker disinclination 33 
towards physical searches that include a bag search and indicate a preference for having a 34 
physical check involving a metal detector/full body scanner over no physical security check. 35 
These three countries have experienced terrorist attacks on public transport facilities in recent 36 
years – which could explain these preferences.  Respondents in Italy prefer both types of 37 
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physical security checks over no physical security checks, whereas those in Bulgaria prefer a 1 
physical check involving a metal detector/full body scanner. Respondents in Luxembourg exhibit 2 
a stronger disinclination towards metal detectors/full body scanners compared to physical 3 
searches and bag checks. 4 
 5 
Delays due to security checks  6 
All respondents prefer travel options that take less time to avoid any additional delay due to 7 
security checks. No country-specific or socio-economic effects were identified in this attribute. 8 
 9 
Security surcharge on top of the ticket (cost) 10 
Respondents also dislike paying additional security surcharges. Individuals with households with 11 
higher monthly incomes are less sensitive to increases of security surcharge on top of the ticket 12 
(decreasing cost sensitivity with increasing income). In the model, we have merged the 17 13 
income bands into four aggregate bands (monthly income of less than €500, €500 to 1,250, 14 
€1,250 to 5,000, and greater than €5,000) – grouping the adjacent bands when the coefficients 15 
are not statistically different for individual income bands. A significant proportion (13.7 per cent) 16 
of respondents refused to report their income, as they answered ‘prefer not to say’ or ‘don’t 17 
know’. A separate coefficient for surcharge on top of the ticket cost is estimated for this group of 18 
respondents. Furthermore, the respondents in this group are split by country of residence using 19 
low-, medium- and high-income country groups to account for the wide range of average income 20 
across the EU27. Thus the final model contains cost coefficients for seven different groups based 21 
on their answers to the income question. 22 
 23 
Differences by socio-economic status 24 
We also tested differences in respondents' preferences based on age (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 25 
45 to 54, 55 to 64 and 65 plus), gender, working status (full time, part time, looking after family, 26 
unemployed, student, retired, not in work due to disability, seeking work, and other), education 27 
level, income, and location of residence (big city, suburb, town, village, countryside/farm). These 28 
effects are tested on all attribute levels (except on attributes delay and cost) and on the constant 29 
for the ‘none of these’ alternative. We observe the following significant effects: 30  Respondents of all age groups and across the EU27 prefer CCTV cameras than 'No 31 
CCTV'. However, the preference is weaker for young people (aged 18 to 24) and stronger 32 
for those aged between 55 and 64. In addition, we observe that while both males and 33 
females prefer CCTV cameras, females have stronger preference for CCTV cameras 34 
compared to males. 35  Young respondents (aged 18 to 24) across the EU27 have a stronger disinclination 36 
towards physical checks involving metal detectors/full body scanners compared to other 37 
age groups. Also, young people (aged 18 to 24) show a stronger disinclination towards 38 
choosing the ‘none of these’ alternative – indicating that they are more likely to choose 39 
alternatives A and B, which present a combination of security, surveillance and privacy 40 
levels.  41 
42 
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CONCLUSION 1 
This paper presents empirical evidence from a EU27-wide survey aimed to examine individuals' 2 
preferences for different aspects of data privacy in the context of train/metro travel in Europe. 3 
The preferences are collected across seven dimensions each forming an attribute taking different 4 
levels in a stated preference experiment. These dimensions include type of surveillance 5 
technology (CCTV spanning basic to advanced features), the storage time for surveillance data, 6 
geographic level of data access by police authorities (i.e., country of residence, EU, worldwide), 7 
level of specialisation of security personnel, type of security checks, delays to go through these 8 
security checks, and potential surcharge to cover security costs.  9 
 10 
Overall, Europeans were in favour of surveillance using CCTV with most popular preference 11 
being for CCTV technology that can detect faces. We did, however, observe cross-country 12 
variations; respondents in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 13 
Poland, Portugal, and Slovakia expressed lower strength of preference than other counties. 14 
Respondents across all countries were in favour of a 15-day storage period of footage recorded 15 
via CCTV, except in Greece. Czech's were averse to options that involved storage of footage for 16 
45 days and the Spanish were in favour of longer than shorter periods of storing CCTV footage. 17 
Respondents prefered that the disclosure of CCTV data should be limited to police within the 18 
home country rather than shared with police authorities across Europe or Worldwide. With regard 19 
to security personnel at train/metro stations, Europeans would prefer unarmed police officers at 20 
stations over unarmed police and private security personnel. Again preferences for security 21 
personnel exhibited cross country variations; for example, respondents in Belgium and France 22 
preferred armed police over the unarmed police. Respondents were in favour of passive security 23 
checks such as body scanners and metal detectors and were averse to physical checks, but again 24 
with significant differences in strength of preference across countries. Finally, respondents were 25 
less likely to choose travel settings that involved increased delays and security surcharges against 26 
security. There could be a number of reasons for the variation in prefrences in some of the 27 
countries, including – culture, history of surveillance, history of terrorist attacks on public 28 
transport facilities, etc.  29 
 30 
There were three particular cases which shed light on the role that past context and history plays 31 
in peoples preferences. Our research revealed a marked divergence in how Greek respondents 32 
viewed the storage of CCTV data, compared to other countries. This may be due to a number of 33 
reasons, notably the storage of records associated with Communist sympathizers during the civil 34 
war (1945-49) or the time of the military dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974). This historical legacy 35 
could have resulted in a general distrust of any collection of records (Mitrou, et al 2014).  36 
Nonetheless, the observation is interesting since one would expect, given the strong legacy of a 37 
surveillance state in East Germany during the Cold War (1951-1991) that Germany would be the 38 
divergent country in regard to this attribute. The fact that they, nor any of the other Eastern 39 
European countries where state surveillance was endemic (Hungary, Romania; Czech Republic 40 
etc.) were divergent is also perhaps revealing about the familiarity to such surveillance measures 41 
(or that these countries have more CCTV relative to the others). 42 
 43 
There is a second interesting divergence in regard to the identified prferences of German 44 
respondents, who are shown by our analysis to dislike armed security at train/metro stations 45 
relative to other countries. Whilst at first glance Germany, especially in the 1930-1940s may 46 
present an obvious answer the reality may be more complex. In Germany, law enforcement is soley 47 
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the responsibility of the State, in particular police and municipalities departments of public order 1 
(Frevel, 2013). Private security is restricted and private secrurity firms, as elsewhere, cannot use 2 
force or arrest individuals. Since Germany is a federal state, there are specific federal-level police 3 
departments rather than a general national police force. The federal nature of the country with its 4 
16 lander (states) may also play a role, if only to demonstrate that reluctance for public/private 5 
personnel to carry firearms transcends state borders.  6 
 7 
Finally, the third inter-country difference concerns respondents in Bulgaria, UK, Spain, France and 8 
Italy displaying dislike of metal detectors / full body scanners compared to respondents from other 9 
countries. For Bulgaria, the answer may lie in the absence of such technologies of this kind of 10 
infrastructure; Sofia’s metro is small consistiting of two lines. For the other countries, this may be 11 
due to the effect of the country has been subject to terrorist attacks, especially the UK and Spain 12 
where prior to the fieldwork there have been terrorist attacks launched against metro/rail 13 
infrastructures. 14 
 15 
Overall, analysis of the data illustrates the complexity of the privacy / security debate as it 16 
pertains to transportation infrastructures. In particular, the increased use of transportation user 17 
data for various reasons outlined above (efficiency, safety and security) can pose complex social 18 
and ethical challenges to users, especially around perceptions of consent, accountability and 19 
transparency. 20 
 21 
Privacy as a term is regarded as highly malleable (Solove, 2011) and the results presented here 22 
illustrate that in the context of transportation infrastructure, challenges to privacy are seen as 23 
stemming from invasions into the person space of users (through pat downs or other forms of 24 
searching), in addition to more complex concepts regarding consent, control and accountability 25 
of personal data about travellers collected through these infrastructures. Privacy issues in the 26 
transportation domain are thus different because they conflate privacy as it relates to personal 27 
space (physicality) and privacy as it relates to control of personal data about oneself. 28 
 29 
  30 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 1 
The empirical evidence from this study contributes to some interesting insights which can inform 2 
policy. 3  The study highlights that acceptability of surveillance and security measures depends on 4 
the level of access to personal information. Thus the regulations/infrastructure designed 5 
around security and privacy need to address the concerns relating to certain forms of 6 
surveillance and measures. 7  While the level of similarity of preferences observed across the EU27 is noteworthy, 8 
there are interesting differences. For example, in countries that have experienced 9 
terrorism on transport facilities in recent past, respondents indicate stronger preferences 10 
for metal detectors, unlike other countries in EU27. Further, certain groups of 11 
respondents have different preferences than others. The security and surveillance 12 
infrastructure needs to take into account the needs of various segments of society. 13  From a regulatory perspective, the issues most at stake concern creating a culture of 14 
accountability, particularly where public and private organisations are involved in the 15 
collection and use of these data. Whilst private sector organisations may collect such data 16 
in order to deliver efficiencies in network management, the same data might be useful 17 
and could be disclosed to government bodies in the interests of law enforcement or 18 
national security.  Further challenges exist in communicating these terms and conditions 19 
of data to the users of transportation facilities. 20 
 21 
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 22 
This study is first ever to provide an evidence on citizen’s security and privacy preferences 23 
across the EU27 using a stated preference survey. The strength of this study lies in the rich 24 
insights it provides on public preferences towards type of surveillance, data privacy settings, 25 
security personnel, and security checks. Limitations of this study include possible sources of 26 
error due to survey nonresponse, question wording and question order. While this research 27 
presents an aggregate picture for EU27, it does not estimate country specific models which could 28 
provide even greater insight into variations across the 27 Member States. Further, this study is 29 
subject to the limitations of a stated preference survey. Actual real-life preferences may be 30 
different and the concerns could change with time. Nevertheless, the findings presented here are 31 
useful to understand the relative preferences and contribute to the scarce evidence base on trends 32 
in preferences related to privacy and security.     33 
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APPENDIX   1 
 2 
Country codes 3 
BE Belgium 4 
BG Bulgaria 5 
CZ Czech Republic 6 
DK Denmark 7 
DE Germany 8 
EE Estonia 9 
IE Ireland 10 
EL Greece 11 
ES Spain 12 
FR France 13 
IT Italy 14 
CY Cyprus 15 
LV Latvia 16 
LT Lithuania 17 
LU Luxembourg 18 
HU Hungary 19 
MT Malta 20 
NL Netherlands 21 
AT Austria 22 
PL Poland 23 
PT Portugal 24 
RO Romania 25 
SI Slovenia 26 
SK Slovakia 27 
FI Finland 28 
SE Sweden 29 
UK United Kingdom  30 
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